Case Report | From “Received” to “Returned for supplementary documents”: A one-year sentence after inflated amounts were removed in an unemployment benefits fraud case
Basic case information
| Charge | Fraud involving unemployment insurance benefits |
|---|---|
| Client’s role | Intermediary who contacted clients and operated the employer’s social insurance account |
| Outcome | The court imposed one year’s imprisonment. |
I. The predicament: A broker arranging sham employment amid the crackdown on social insurance fraud
Amid the current crackdown on fraud against social insurance funds, cases involving unemployment insurance benefits often face particularly strict scrutiny over conviction and sentencing once an investigation is opened.
Under the interpretation of Article 266 of the Criminal Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, using deception, falsified supporting documents or similar means to obtain old-age, medical, work injury or unemployment insurance benefits is punishable as fraud involving public or private property. In that chain of activity, the authorities often view brokers who specialise in arranging sham affiliations and fabricating employment relationships as particularly culpable and as central to carrying out the fraud.
L was a broker closely involved in that chain. He contacted and referred “clients” looking to obtain unemployment benefits in breach of the rules and discussed commissions and the process with them directly. He also controlled the company’s account in the employer portal for social insurance. He personally used it to “add” and “remove” employees from the system, creating the false impression that the individuals had worked for the company and then lost their jobs involuntarily.
Once the case moved into review for prosecution and then to trial, the accusations were particularly serious. The application records were extensive. In an initial tally based on the applicant list, the authorities included every amount claimed through L or linked to him in the allegations. If the entire amount counted as completed fraud, the sentencing threshold would rise sharply and he would face a lengthy prison term.
Faced with figures produced by this mechanical aggregation, the family retained lawyer Zhang Fan to take part in L’s criminal defence.
II. Tracing the claims: Following application numbers to uncover inflated amounts listed as “credited”
In social insurance fraud cases, an itemised list of allegations can look complete while concealing a deeper flaw. Investigators or social insurance agencies often count amounts using the “list of applications submitted” or “system-generated amounts”. This makes it easy to overlook where the money actually went.
After taking the case, lawyer Zhang Fan adopted an approach of going back to the source of each claim and examining it individually. Counsel looked beyond the summary list and used the “benefit application reference number” in the human resources and social security system as the sole lead. Counsel brought four groups of key evidence together in one table and cross-checked them exhaustively.
- Social insurance system operation logs and account login histories.
- Paper documents supporting the fabricated employment relationships and termination of employment contracts.
- Review and approval statuses in the social insurance bureau’s official internal system.
- Detailed transaction records from the bank responsible for making the final payments from the social insurance fund.
The comparison exposed a major gap in what had appeared to be an airtight list of allegations.
Among the amounts the prosecution had listed as “successfully claimed and constituting completed fraud”, one application was marked “Returned for supplementary documents” on the details page in the social insurance bureau’s internal review system. The bank’s disbursement records confirmed that no money had ever been transferred or credited for that claim!
This was a serious “mismatch in the findings of fact”.
The application had been returned during review and the money had never been disbursed. The claim had therefore been stopped in accordance with the law at the administrative approval stage. The social insurance fund had suffered no actual loss of property, and the conduct for this claim could not be classified as a completed offence under criminal law. Yet the authorities had included it in their initial rough tally as money L had already obtained through completed fraud.
III. Drawing the distinction: Separating “approved” from “credited” to remove inflated amounts
Once the defence identified this key flaw, lawyer Zhang Fan promptly took the evidentiary challenge further.
-
Excluding amounts attributable to attempts or based on fictitious figures.
Counsel submitted as separate evidence a screenshot of the review page showing “Returned for supplementary documents” and the records documenting retrieval of the corresponding bank transactions. Counsel singled out this claim for exclusion from the list of completed offences with “confirmed receipt” and asked the court to verify whether further documents had later been filed or the claim had subsequently been approved. The inquiry established that the claim had not been pursued after it was returned and that no loss had occurred.
-
Matching the evidence at every stage to form a complete chain.
Social insurance fraud cases are highly technical. Counsel explained these distinctions to the court.
- The operation logs and account records answer “whether L handled this claim”, distinguishing what L did from the actions of other platform operators.
- The documents on termination of employment answer “whether deceptive means were used”.
- The review decision and the bank’s disbursement records ultimately answer “whether the fraudulent claim was approved and whether public funds actually suffered a loss”.
Only claims supported by a complete and consistent chain of evidence across those four points can form the basis for deciding the case and determining the sentence. Amounts merely applied for but never approved, or returned in the system with no matching bank transactions, must be excluded from the amount attributed to completed offences.
Faced with clear system screenshots and bank records, the prosecution had to re-examine its counting criteria. A key portion of the previously inflated amount was removed in accordance with the law.
IV. The decision: Responsibility was determined precisely, and L received a one-year prison sentence
At trial, the collegiate panel fully heard and examined counsel’s submissions challenging the evidence.
The court ultimately confirmed that, in assessing unemployment insurance fraud, the submission of an application must be distinguished strictly from the actual loss of funds. In accordance with the law, it accepted the defence submissions seeking the exclusion of amounts that had never been approved or credited. It precisely determined the amount of the joint offence that L had actually handled and for which money had actually been received. The court also took his truthful statements and active cooperation in returning proceeds into account when exercising its discretion to impose a lighter sentence.
The court then pronounced judgment in accordance with the law.
The court sentenced L to one year’s imprisonment.
Amid the crackdown targeting every link in schemes to obtain social insurance funds through fraud, the one-year sentence precisely defined the extent of criminal responsibility and secured a notably favourable result for the client within a reasonable statutory sentencing range.
【Case notes】
In suspected fraud cases involving the improper conversion of social insurance entitlements into cash or fraudulent claims for state benefits, defence counsel should not be intimidated by a long “application roster”. A detailed defence uses objective electronic records to dismantle allegations based on rough totals on paper.
-
Use the “application reference number” to match four kinds of evidence.
Every stage of a social insurance claim leaves a record in the system, from sham affiliation and adding or removing employees to submitting the claim, reviewing and approving it, and paying it out through the bank. Reviewing the case requires following the unique reference number beyond the summary table and checking the enrolment and removal logs, screenshots of approval status and records of actual bank payments one by one. The authorities must not be allowed to treat the “list of applications submitted” as the “amount of completed fraud”.
-
Examine “approved” and “credited” strictly to prevent incorrect findings of completed fraud.
Fraud is complete when public or private property has actually been unlawfully appropriated. Social insurance review takes time, and many applications are marked “Returned for supplementary documents”, “Rejected on review” or “Disbursement suspended”. Precisely excluding amounts for which no actual loss occurred from the overall completed fraud total is central to removing inflation from the amount involved and lowering the sentencing tier.
-
Examine employer portal accounts to distinguish the broker’s responsibility from that of the operators.
Several people often share an account used to add and remove employees from the social insurance system. The system’s IP address records, login logs and exact times of operation must be obtained to determine precisely which individuals the client added or removed and which claims the platform operators filed themselves. This prevents the client from being held responsible for actions others took independently.