Case Report | System Rules Changed and Bail on Day 37: How Did a Shared Account and a Common Egress IP Challenge Attribution of “Unlawful Control”?
Basic case information
| Charge | Suspected unlawful control of a computer information system |
|---|---|
| Client’s role | Person who had been responsible for or had involvement with maintenance of the system in question |
| Stage at which counsel took over | During criminal detention, with submissions at the arrest review stage |
| Outcome | On day 37 of criminal detention, the procuratorate declined to approve arrest and the police arranged release on bail |
I. The predicament: Server rules were suddenly altered, with a decision on arrest looming on day 37
Amid increasingly strict regulation of cybersecurity and data compliance, the authorities have consistently taken a tough approach to criminal cases involving server intrusion and unauthorised system operations.
Under Article 285(2) of the Criminal Law, intruding, in violation of national regulations, into a computer information system outside the fields of state affairs, national defence development and advanced science and technology, or unlawfully controlling such a system, constitutes the offence of unlawfully controlling a computer information system when the conduct reaches a specified number of systems or causes serious consequences. In particularly serious circumstances, the baseline sentence moves into the heavier range of three to seven years’ imprisonment.
In this case, the access rules on an important company server changed unexpectedly during a particular period, compromising the system’s security policy. After receiving a report, the police promptly opened an investigation. The technical investigation focused on Z, who had been responsible for or involved in system maintenance. Investigators suspected Z of using technical means to exercise unlawful control of a computer information system and placed Z in criminal detention in accordance with the law.
The countdown in the criminal proceedings made the situation more urgent still.
In major cybercrime cases, cases involving multiple people working together or cases with complex facts, the maximum period in criminal detention for seeking and reviewing approval of arrest is 37 days. In computer crime cases, the authorities often rely heavily on what the server logs appear to show. Once they conclude that “the system was changed, the person was at the company involved and the logs recorded the activity”, they can readily form a view of guilt and obtain approval of arrest from the procuratorate on day 37. Once arrest is approved, the risks of pretrial detention and conviction can increase considerably.
At this critical point, the family urgently retained lawyer Zhang Fan to take up the defence.
II. The opening: The “shared account” and “common egress address” in the logs
In cases involving computer information systems, many allegations appear to be backed by conclusive evidence, but often conceal a critical mistake. The authorities can treat “activity on a virtual account” as if it were necessarily “the conduct of a particular person in the physical world”.
To rebut the allegation, counsel had to examine the underlying network architecture and access topology. The system rules had indeed changed, but was Z the person at the computer who entered the command?
After meeting the client and obtaining the relevant case materials, lawyer Zhang Fan focused on the server’s underlying system audit and access logs (Audit & Access Log).
A detailed review, line by line, of the log entries at the time the rules were altered exposed two critical gaps in the evidence.
- The account did not authenticate one person exclusively. The server log did not record an account assigned solely to Z under Z’s real name. It recorded a “shared administrator account” used for routine maintenance, with a password known to several people.
- The physical endpoint could not be identified. The source IP address of the command did not point to a specific physical device on the local network. It showed the company’s “shared public egress IP address (NAT egress)” used for external access!
The discovery directly undermined the reasoning behind the allegation.
On a local network, dozens or even hundreds of devices can access a server through a common egress IP. A shared account also means that several team members are in a position to log in and perform operations.
How could the prosecution “rule out reasonable doubt” and insist that Z alone exercised unlawful control based on a virtual account shared by several people and a common public egress IP that obscured the identity of all the internal devices?
III. Looking beneath the surface: Examining work orders, session IDs and the chain of remote connections
Having identified the central problem that the account and IP address could not identify a single person to the exclusion of others, lawyer Zhang Fan looked deeper into the evidence. The defence addressed three questions: where the permissions came from, how the session could be identified, and to whom the operation could be attributed.
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Check the work orders authorising access and establish the limits of lawful maintenance duties.
A change to permissions does not necessarily constitute “unlawful control”. The defence team obtained the internal approval records and work orders from before and after the incident. It compared the precise time when the change command was issued against the maintenance duties Z had actually been assigned. It examined whether the account was within an authorised maintenance window at the time and distinguished normal system testing from malicious activity beyond the scope of authorisation.
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Obtain the “session ID” and request the underlying remote connection records.
Because the common egress IP obscured the physical endpoint, counsel made a specific request for technical verification. A server-side summary was insufficient. The authorities needed to extract the exact session ID for the operation and obtain the underlying remote connection logs for the same period from network perimeter devices, the VPN gateway or the jump host.
Counsel argued that the authorities could establish who the physical device that sent the command belonged to only by tracing the session ID to the actual internal MAC address, the hardware fingerprint and the identity verification records on the jump host.
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Challenge the legal characterisation when the evidence cannot objectively attribute the operation to the client.
Lawyer Zhang Fan submitted a detailed written legal opinion. The evidence established only that the server rules had changed. With several people sharing the account, the common egress obscuring the source, and no direct link to an endpoint, the reasonable possibility that someone else had performed the operation could not be ruled out. Difficulties identifying a user due to inadequate management of the company’s network could not be turned into a presumption that Z had committed an offence.
IV. Breaking the deadlock: Bail on day 37 of criminal detention, before the deadline for arrest approval
At the decisive point of the arrest review on day 37 of criminal detention, counsel urgently submitted a clearly structured legal opinion addressing the flaws in the network logs to the prosecutor handling the case. It was accompanied by a Network Session and Permissions Comparison Table.
After reviewing in full how the server logs recorded the activity, the current account permissions and the gaps in the remote connection records, the prosecutor paid close attention to counsel’s submissions challenging the evidence. The authorities recognised the following.
- The logs on record established only that a shared account and a public egress IP were used. They did not form a complete chain of evidence linking the physical operation to Z personally.
- There was substantial and reasonable doubt that the operation could be attributed to one person to the exclusion of others. The facts remained unclear and key evidence was insufficient, so the statutory evidentiary standard for approving arrest was not met.
On day 37 of criminal detention, the procuratorate lawfully declined to approve arrest and the police granted Z bail!
Z walked out of the detention centre and regained personal liberty just as the detention period was about to expire. The technical contest over underlying server logs and network topology achieved a breakthrough against the odds before the door to arrest closed.
【Case notes】
In cybersecurity cases and cases of unlawfully controlling computer information systems, the prosecution’s evidence often takes the form of system logs that look technically sophisticated but contain many gaps between virtual activity and real-world conduct. Defending these cases calls for three essential technical and legal checks.
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Challenge the identity trap of a “shared account and a common egress IP”.
Many companies have several people using the same admin or root account, and several devices accessing a server through a shared public egress IP via NAT. Counsel must not accept the simple equation of an “IP address and account” with “the suspect personally”. Counsel must examine whether the operation can be traced to a single physical device and user. If other people sharing the account or other devices behind the same egress cannot be ruled out, counsel must challenge any exclusive attribution.
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Use the “session ID” to trace the operation back to the physical device.
What the server sees is often only one end of the connection. The session identifier along the intervening network path is what can help reconstruct who performed the operation. Counsel must ask the authorities for VPN authentication records, jump host activity logs, the router’s NAT translation table or the endpoint’s system logs for the relevant period, to build a complete chain linking the server command, the network session, the endpoint MAC address and the person using the device.
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Before the day-37 deadline, turn “technical doubts” into “legal grounds for declining arrest approval”.
Preserving electronic evidence in cybercrime cases is complex and often takes time. If the authorities can produce only rudimentary server logs within 37 days and the evidence needed to identify an endpoint to the exclusion of others remains unresolved, counsel should promptly explain why a technical finding of “cannot determine” means that the legal “facts remain unclear and the evidence is insufficient”. Holding the authorities to the statutory evidentiary standard for arrest can prevent approval of arrest and secure release on bail.