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Case Report | RMB 5.7 million in fraud allegations over a request for help and both spouses implicated: Misattributed messages helped secure bail after arrest approval

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Basic case information

ChargeSuspected fraud arising from a request to arrange a matter
Client’s roleHolder of the receiving account involved in the case
Amount involvedApproximately RMB 5.7 million in alleged fraud
Stage at which counsel took overAfter the procuratorate approved arrest
OutcomeReleased on bail after arrest had been approved

I. The predicament: The weight of RMB 5.7 million and the risk of “both spouses being implicated”

In private disputes over asking someone to handle a matter or use personal connections to arrange resources, the line between “asking for help” and “fraud” can easily become blurred. If the matter falls through or a refund is difficult to obtain, tensions between the parties can quickly turn a civil dispute over the arrangement into a criminal complaint.

In this case, a dispute over money paid to have a matter handled went straight into criminal proceedings. The alleged fraud amounted to approximately RMB 5.7 million.

Under Article 266 of China’s Criminal Law, fraud involving public or private property worth RMB 500,000 or more falls into the “particularly huge amount” category. RMB 5.7 million was more than ten times that threshold, placing the statutory sentencing baseline in the severe range from ten years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment.

Compounding the difficulty, the case implicated both L and L’s spouse. In practice, once both spouses are linked to large transfers, the authorities can readily form a preliminary view that they “committed the offence jointly” and “were accomplices”. When the bank account involved is in one spouse’s name, the account holder can find it particularly hard to clear their name.

By the time the family retained lawyer Zhang Fan, the procuratorate had already formally approved L’s arrest on suspicion of fraud.

With RMB 5.7 million at stake and arrest already approved, had L known what was happening from the start? What role had L played in the arrangement and in receiving the money? Without a breakthrough on the evidence and the need for continued detention, L faced lengthy and perilous proceedings.

II. The opening: When oral statements collided with the original messages

After arrest approval, an effective defence cannot rest on a general assertion that the client “did not know”. The authorities look for “objective corroboration” rather than “oral explanations”.

After taking the case, lawyer Zhang Fan cross-checked the prosecution’s statements against the electronic records that had been obtained, word by word and sentence by sentence. Comparing several statements and documents brought one crucial contradiction to light.

In a statement in the case file, the prosecution materials directly identified the bank account holder, L, as “the person who requested payment and gave out the receiving account number”.

But a full review of the original WeChat messages and text messages from before and after the arrangement showed the opposite. The person who discussed how the matter would be handled directly with the payer and sent the receiving bank account number of their own accord was L’s spouse throughout!

This was a crucial case of “mistaken attribution”.

In statements after the event, payers may recall matters inaccurately after seeing the name on the bank account. They may then conflate “the owner of the account that received the money” with “the person who asked for payment to handle the matter”. Unless the authorities check the original communications in detail, that written statement could directly support the damaging allegation that L had “actively solicited the money and participated throughout”.

III. Looking beneath the surface: Separating “promises, receipt and control” into three lines of inquiry

Having identified the discrepancy between the objective evidence and the statement, lawyer Zhang Fan promptly drew on the additional factual account provided by L’s spouse and separated the events that had been treated as one into three distinct lines of inquiry.

  1. First line of inquiry: Who communicated with the payer and made the false promises?

    Counsel obtained all call records and written communications from before the money changed hands. They confirmed that L’s spouse independently conducted and maintained all communication with the payer about the background to the arrangement, the specific matter to be handled and the promises made about it. L had never directly made any false assurance or guarantee to the payer that the matter would be completed.

  2. Second line of inquiry: Who provided the account, and when did the money arrive?

    In everyday family life, it is common for spouses to use each other’s bank accounts or share their use. The messages and transfer records clearly confirmed that L’s spouse alone gave the bank account number to the payer. Although L was the account holder, L did not take part in checking or confirming the transfer when the money first arrived.

  3. Third line of inquiry: Who actually issued transfer instructions and controlled the funds?

    “Receiving the money” does not equate to “controlling the money”. Counsel obtained the complete bank transaction history after the account received RMB 5.7 million and traced the source of the online banking instructions. The evidence fully established that once the money was in the account, its subsequent allocation, outgoing transfers and destinations were all directly controlled by instructions from L’s spouse. L had no authority to decide where the money went and neither actually took possession of it nor squandered it.

Lawyer Zhang Fan charted the three elements of “promises to the payer, receipt into the account and subsequent transfers” on a detailed comparative timeline and formally submitted the following written legal opinion to the authorities.

The account’s passive receipt of the money cannot, by itself, establish a shared intent to commit a joint offence. It is essential to determine separately when the account holder learned the nature of the funds and who issued the transfer instructions. In the absence of prior collusion or control over the funds as events unfolded, L posed very little danger to society in the case and did not meet the statutory conditions requiring continued detention.

IV. Breaking the deadlock: Securing bail after approval of arrest

The authorities paid close attention to the legal opinion, which clearly set the inaccuracies in the statements against the objective electronic evidence.

The officers handling the case retrieved and verified the chain of instructions for moving the funds and the original messages again. They accepted the defence’s main argument about “clarifying the boundary of responsibility between the account holder and the person who actually controlled the funds” and carefully reassessed L’s culpable intent, degree of participation and danger to society in the case.

The barrier to release came down. After formal approval of arrest, the authorities lawfully changed the compulsory measure and granted L bail!

Leaving the detention centre meant that L had regained personal liberty. It also meant that, facing the risk of severe punishment in a case involving RMB 5.7 million, the defence had successfully prevented the authorities from treating L as “a principal offender in the case as a whole who jointly appropriated the money”, gaining valuable room to act in the proceedings that followed.

【Case notes】

In criminal allegations arising from requests to handle or coordinate a matter, “both spouses being implicated” or “use of another person’s account” creates a serious risk of unjust suspicion and excessive attribution of responsibility. A detailed defence in such cases should examine three points.

  1. Challenge the crude assumption that “the account holder is the person who asked for the money”.

    Transfers in these cases often involve large sums, and victims and authorities can fall into the habit of thinking that “the person whose card it is must be the mastermind”. The original channels of communication, including WeChat, text messages and email, must be checked message by message to establish who sent the account number and who requested payment, guarding against mistaken attribution in a victim’s later recollection.

  2. Examine three distinct powers: “making promises, receiving payment and controlling funds”.

    Whether an arrangement to have a matter handled constitutes fraud turns on whether facts were fabricated and property was unlawfully appropriated. The defence must examine these three powers separately. Who made promises to the payer? Who provided the account details? After the money arrived, whose instructions determined where it was transferred? Showing that the client neither directed the promises nor controlled the funds is necessary to rebut a finding of shared intent to commit fraud in accordance with the law.

  3. Use objective electronic records to examine whether relatives “shared a criminal intent”.

    When family members are implicated, the hardest claim to prove is “I didn’t know what they were doing with the card”. A claim of innocence alone is insufficient. The instructions behind the bank transfers, household spending and transfers at the time, and the point at which the client actually learned about the funds must corroborate one another. Showing that the client passively lent the account or learned about its use after the event is decisive in seeking a refusal to approve arrest, bail after arrest approval or ultimately clearing the client of the allegation.

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