Case Report | A Personal Information Allegation Over Online Education Verification: How Did an “Unidentified Recipient” in an Order Note Help Secure Bail on Day 30?
Basic case information
| Charge | Suspected infringement of citizens’ personal information |
|---|---|
| Client’s role | Provider of online data verification and information consultancy services |
| Stage at which counsel took over | Investigation stage, after criminal detention began |
| Outcome | Released on bail on day 30 of criminal detention |
I. The predicament: The line between lawful verification and criminal liability broke down
Amid stricter enforcement in all areas of big data and personal information protection, the “offence of infringing citizens’ personal information” has become a serious criminal risk for online data services, background checks and intermediaries.
Under the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Criminal Cases of Infringing Citizens’ Personal Information, unlawfully obtaining, selling or providing 5,000 or more records of ordinary personal information, or making RMB 5,000 or more in unlawful proceeds, constitutes “serious circumstances” under Article 253-1 of the Criminal Law and crosses the threshold for criminal liability. Reaching ten times those thresholds carries a heavier sentence of three to seven years’ imprisonment. In the era of large-scale data searches, thousands of records and thousands of yuan in transactions can easily be swallowed up in the figures from a few bulk exports.
In this case, G provided online data verification and related information consultancy services. The police suddenly placed G in criminal detention on suspicion of infringing citizens’ personal information. They alleged that G had used an online platform to retrieve other people’s information in breach of the rules and resold it to others for profit.
The countdown in the criminal proceedings made the situation even more urgent.
At the outset, the authorities often obtain the platform’s total number of back-end queries and the incoming and outgoing transactions in the client’s account. They broadly link the two and conclude that “the volume of data involved was huge and the unlawful gains were substantial”. For investigators, day 30 of criminal detention is the statutory deadline for deciding whether to ask the procuratorate to review and approve an arrest. Once a request is made and arrest is approved, lengthy pretrial detention is unavoidable.
When lawyer Zhang Fan took the case, this data dispute was already counting down to a decision on whether to seek arrest approval. The defence had a clear task. It needed to overturn the prosecution’s broad “blanket inference” from the platform logs by examining the underlying data and financial transactions one at a time to establish what actually happened.
II. The opening: “Verification of educational qualifications” in the authorisation and a missing link in the order notes
In cases of infringing citizens’ personal information, the prosecution’s central allegation often runs as follows: “You queried the data and received money, so you unlawfully obtained the information and resold it for profit.” To challenge that reasoning, counsel must examine each transaction’s “query permissions, authorised purpose and actual delivery chain”.
After meeting the client and reviewing the initial case materials, lawyer Zhang Fan brought the platform query logs, service orders and original authorisation documents together in a single table for comparison.
Matching the records closely brought a critical gap in the evidence to light.
The platform’s original authorisation agreement expressly described the authorised service as “verification of educational qualifications”, a legitimate and compliant form of background checking. Yet in the corresponding downstream order notes, some buyers had unilaterally requested that G “provide the relevant material to other third parties”.
At first glance, the authorities could easily treat an order note like this as conclusive evidence of “reselling personal information”. Lawyer Zhang Fan went beyond the words in the notes and followed the order numbers to check the final file delivery records and the payments received.
The review uncovered a major flaw in the prosecution’s chain of evidence.
Although the order notes asked for the material to be provided to others, the actual file delivery records contained no corresponding account for a real third-party recipient and no proof of delivery. For several orders that the prosecution had included in its list of offences, the case file never established whether the data was ultimately sent or who actually received it. Those questions remained “unsupported by evidence and unresolved”!
A request does not establish that the client delivered the data. A query in the system does not establish that the data was unlawfully passed to the black market. This gap in the objective chain of evidence gave the defence its key opening to challenge a finding of a “completed unlawful sale”.
III. Looking beneath the surface: Three separate checks to remove duplicate records and identify lawful service fees
Having identified the key problem of the “unidentified recipient”, lawyer Zhang Fan examined the evidence further, breaking it down by the nature of the information, the number of records and the purpose of the fees.
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Verify the count by distinguishing “repeat exports” from “separate disclosures”.
The number of information records is central to deciding which sentencing range applies. In an initial review, the authorities often count the platform’s “total export records” or the “number of files stored locally” without further scrutiny.
The defence team checked the original data, the extraction lists, export timestamps and actual receipt records one by one. Counsel pointed out that much of the apparently large volume consisted of repeated exports of the same data on different dates for reconciliation or backup. Consistent with the judicial interpretation, data provided repeatedly to the same recipient or passed around more than once for technical reasons cannot simply be counted cumulatively. Counsel therefore pressed for the removal of duplicate records that inflated the count.
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Examine who had the rights and for what purpose, and distinguish lawful authorisation from activity outside its scope.
The distinction between lawful background checking and a criminal infringement of personal information depends on whether the person had authority to log in and run queries, obtain data in bulk and act in the lawful performance of their duties.
Counsel divided the disputed material into “lawfully authorised verification” and “suspected retrieval beyond the scope of authorisation”. This showed that G had obtained authorisation to run queries in advance for most transactions and was providing ordinary services for recruitment background checks and verification of educational qualifications, without criminal intent to buy or sell information unlawfully.
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Trace the payments and separate “normal service fees” from “unlawful proceeds”.
When assessing “unlawful proceeds”, the prosecution often seeks to treat all amounts received into the account involved as a single sum.
Using the “order number”, the defence team matched each fee to the corresponding service quotation, the work actually delivered and the messages exchanged at the time.
- Exclude ordinary fees for lawful commercial services such as legitimate consultancy, background verification and technical support.
- Exclude entries for services that were ultimately not delivered or payments that had been refunded.
- List separately the payments actually linked to the disputed information. This undermined the prosecution’s use of the full account turnover to infer “substantial unlawful gains”.
Just before the police were due to decide whether to seek approval of arrest, lawyer Zhang Fan formally submitted the Itemised List of Orders with Unverified Delivery and Recipients, the Comparison Table of Deductions from the Record Count, and a full written legal opinion to the department handling the case.
The key evidence on record does not form a complete chain, and the actual recipients of the material in the principal orders remain in doubt. The data count involves serious double counting, and the amounts received include ordinary payment for lawful services. The facts of the case remain unclear and the evidence is insufficient. The statutory conditions for requesting approval of arrest are not met.
IV. Breaking the deadlock: Bail on day 30 of criminal detention, before the deadline for requesting approval of arrest
In criminal proceedings, day 30 of criminal detention is the crucial point at which investigators must decide whether to “request approval of arrest or release the person in accordance with the law”.
The authorities carefully reassessed all the evidence in light of counsel’s table tracing where the orders went, the basis for deducting records from the count, and the opinion distinguishing payments by their nature. The officers recognised a critical gap in the evidence supporting the allegation of “unlawfully providing information”. The actual destination of some orders still needed verification, the objective evidence for seeking approval of arrest was not solid, and the danger posed by the client could be managed. The statutory conditions requiring continued detention were absent.
On day 30 of criminal detention, the authorities completed the bail procedures in accordance with the law. G walked out of the detention centre and regained personal liberty!
With the statutory period of detention almost exhausted, close scrutiny of the underlying orders, where the data went and what the payments were for prevented the case from going to arrest approval. It gave the client valuable room to act in the proceedings before crossing the threshold for a heavier sentence.
【Case notes】
In cases of infringing citizens’ personal information involving the movement and verification of data on online platforms, the evidence is often characterised by its large volume and potential to mislead. Defending businesses or practitioners in these cases calls for three key checks.
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An “order note” does not establish “actual delivery”. Find the real recipient.
Online transaction records are complex. A note or request left by a buyer alone does not establish that a transaction was completed. Counsel must use the order number to trace the back-end transmission logs, the actual receiving account and the download records. Orders still under review for which there is no proof that data reached a third party must not be treated as a “completed sale or disclosure”.
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Scrutinise the data extraction process to prevent “repeat exports” from becoming “records counted towards the offence”.
The number of information records can determine both whether an offence has been committed and whether a higher sentencing range applies. The authorities can easily rely on the “number of rows in seized files” or the “total number of platform queries logged”. Counsel must require the prosecution to compare the original data against the extraction lists and remove system-generated duplicates, backup exports of the same source data and repeated transmissions to the same recipient. This brings the inflated numbers back to what the evidence supports.
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Distinguish “combined service fees” from “gains from buying and selling information”.
Account transactions can include lawful consultancy fees, payment for background checks and even technical service fees. Counsel must not allow the prosecution to treat the account’s entire income as “unlawful proceeds”. Each payment must be traced back through the “order number, quotation and deliverable” to separate legitimate remuneration and normal business income. This can substantially reduce the applicable sentencing range alleged by the prosecution or remove the basis for that range altogether.