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Case Report | From “founding team veteran” to a four-year sentencing recommendation: The limits of knowledge and responsibility behind an online banking authorisation

Illustration of an authorization record and a translucent timeline on a dark blue desk
Illustrative cover image

Basic case information

ChargeSuspected illegal absorption of public deposits
Client’s roleWorked in finance at the company from its founding
Stage at which counsel took overAfter transfer for review for prosecution
OutcomeDuring review for prosecution, the procuratorate recommended four years’ imprisonment.

I. The predicament: A finance employee there from the start

When the courts assess economic crimes involving many members of the public, the combination of two labels, “finance employee” and “founding team veteran”, often signals extremely serious criminal charges.

In this case, the client, R, had worked in finance at the company involved from the time it was founded. R kept the books in its early days and stayed through the deterioration of the platform’s operations and the breakdown of its funding chain. When the storm over the illegal absorption of public deposits hit, that long tenure led investigators to regard R almost as a key accomplice who had “known what was happening from the start and taken part in the central coordination throughout”.

Given the enormous sums involved and the long period the case covered, holding R responsible for all the funds taken in would expose R to a lengthy prison term in the “huge amount” tier.

After the case was transferred for review for prosecution, the family retained lawyer Zhang Fan to defend R. The hardest issue facing the defence was those several years of employment. How could counsel show, across so long a period, that a rank-and-file finance employee had not been “fully informed and deeply involved in directing operations” from the first day?

II. The opening: A “clash in timing” between a written statement and the online banking logs

During review for prosecution, the central task of the defence was to put the pieces of the factual record back together.

Relying solely on a general statement from the employer or on the client’s ambiguous account could easily lead to the vague conclusion that R had “always been responsible for finance and always been in charge of the books”. Lawyer Zhang Fan examined the case file closely, placing R’s employment contract, job description, online banking authorisation form, approval emails and paper accounting vouchers on a single detailed timeline and comparing them from several angles.

The comparison immediately exposed a fatal contradiction within the case file.

In a written statement in the file, a person involved in the case insisted that R had been “responsible for reviewing fund transfers all year”. Yet the system authorisation records retrieved from the online banking back end showed that R’s review permissions had not formally been activated until the middle of that year!

There was a crucial gap of several months between being “responsible all year” and the permissions being “activated midyear”.

Who actually conducted the reviews before the online banking permissions were activated? Once R had those permissions, did R’s so-called “review” involve real control over the funds, or was it a routine step in passing instructions along?

That objective difference in timing, buried beneath the written statements, gave the defence its first opening to dismantle the allegations as a whole.

III. Drawing the distinctions: Challenging “knowledge from the start” and reconstructing the actual approval chain

Having established when the online banking permissions were granted, lawyer Zhang Fan went further and quickly began a detailed examination.

  1. Dividing the employment into distinct periods.

    Taking the activation of online banking review permissions at midyear as the dividing point, counsel separated R’s work into two distinct periods, “before authorisation” and “after authorisation”.

  2. Tracing the approval logs and signed vouchers back to their source.

    Before the permissions were activated, R followed standard procedures to handle basic paperwork and never reviewed or approved transfers from the core pool of funds. Once the permissions were activated, R’s review actions were all based on explicit approval instructions sent by supervisors by email and on decisions they had signed. R never had independent authority to release funds or make financing decisions.

  3. Examining intent and the extent of R’s knowledge.

    Under the Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases of Illegal Fundraising issued by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security, determining a finance employee’s criminal intent requires a comprehensive assessment of professional experience, employment background, work processes and involvement in public promotion, among other factors. R had taken no part in any public-facing fundraising pitches and received no commissions tied to fundraising performance. In substance, R was still carrying out internal management instructions as directed.

Lawyer Zhang Fan systematically set out how the tasks R actually performed matched the permissions in the system, with details of the separate time periods and an index of the objective evidence, in written legal submissions to the procuratorate. Counsel argued that the broad description “employed from the company’s founding” could not justify an inference that R knew what was happening throughout, much less make R answer for funds outside R’s authority or for the full criminal responsibility in the case.

IV. The result: Defining the limits of the evidence and securing a four-year sentencing recommendation

After receiving the written submissions and evidence comparison table, which clearly laid out the facts and matched the records closely, the prosecutor handling the case carefully reassessed the period of R’s involvement, R’s actual duties and the amount for which R should be held responsible.

The authorities ultimately accepted the main defence arguments. They acknowledged the differences in R’s duties across the periods in question, drew a substantive distinction between R and the platform executives at the centre of planning and decision-making, and assessed R’s position and role in the joint offence more leniently in accordance with the law.

At the end of the prosecution review, the procuratorate lawfully recommended four years’ imprisonment for R.

In an economic crime involving many members of the public, a finance employee who had worked at the company from its founding until the crisis broke might originally have faced charges carrying a much harsher sentence. Bringing the prosecutor’s recommendation within this range laid a firm foundation for seeking a clearer, more favourable judgment for R at the subsequent trial.

【Case notes】

In economic crimes involving many members of the public, finance employees who joined when a company was founded often face a serious risk of being presumed to bear greater responsibility. A detailed defence in such cases should examine three points closely.

  1. Use “objective system logs” to disprove “oral accounts”.

    Statements from alleged accomplices or the company often reflect an attempt to shift responsibility or the effects of uncertain recollection. Objective electronic data such as online banking authorisation forms, back-end operation logs and records of applications for USB security tokens are the only hard indicators for reconstructing when the person actually carried out the duties in question.

  2. A “long tenure” never means “the same responsibility throughout”.

    Many clients performed only administrative or internal support work in the company’s early days and were drawn into some processes only later, as the business took an irregular turn. The figures must be examined separately for each period, strictly following the timeline of job and authorisation changes. Periods when the person had no authorisation or did not take part in substance must be excluded from the allegations.

  3. Distinguish “passing on instructions” from “initiating decisions”.

    Finance staff can easily be presumed to have known what was going on simply because they handled money or signed a document. The defence must trace the fund approval chain back to its source and establish who decided to raise the money, who issued the payment instructions and who ultimately received the funds. Showing that the client merely carried out instructions at the end of the chain and made no excess gains is key to preventing an adverse finding about the client’s state of mind.

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